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Notes
ENFORCEABILITY OF EXECUTIVE-CONGRESSIONAL AGREEMENTS
IN LIEU OF AN ARTICLE II TREATY FOR PURPOSES OF
EXTRADITION: ELIZAPHAN NTAKIRUTIMANA v. JANET RENO
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Constitution does not expressly refer to executive
branch authority to conclude international agreements other than trea-
ties, executive agreements have become an accepted part of United States
law and practice.' More than ninety percent of the United States' interna-
tional agreements are one of three types of executive agreements. 2 The
1. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (recognizing that
not all international agreements are treaties requiring Senate participation). Bel-
mont dealt with an executive agreement entered into by the President of the
United States with the government of the Soviet Union. See id. Under this agree-
ment, the United States recognized the government of the Soviet Union, estab-
lished diplomatic relations between the two countries and exchanged
ambassadors. See id. (detailing aspects of agreement). Because the agreement was
entered into without the participation of the Senate, the validity of the agreement
was challenged. See id. (explaining challenge to agreement). The Supreme Court
recognized the authority of the executive to speak as the sole organ of the United
States government over foreign affairs. See id. (recognizing authority of executive).
Furthermore, the Court stated that "an international compact, as this was, is not
always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate." Id; see Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981) (recognizing President's power to enter
into executive agreements without obtaining advice and consent of Senate);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (positing that "[t]he powers of the
President in the conduct of foreign relations included the power, without consent
of the Senate, to determine the public policy of the United States"); Altman & Co.
v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-01 (1911) (recognizing that certain interna-
tional compacts do not require advice and consent of Senate).
An executive agreement has been defined as "an international agreement or
as a memorandum of understanding, memorandum of agreement, memorandum
of arrangement, exchange of notes, exchange of letters, technical arrangement,
protocol, note verbal, aide memoir, statement of understanding or any other
name," so long as the parties intend a legal obligation under international law.
United States Dep't of State Circular 175, 22 C.F.R. pt. 181, encl. 2, para. la(3)
(1985).
2. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES 22-23
(Comm. Print 1977) (summarizing international agreements entered into by
United States from 1976 and 1972) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH]. The
three types of international agreements other than treaties are the treaty author-
ized executive agreement, the sole executive agreement and the executive-congres-
sional agreement. See Kenneth C. Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1089,
1092-93 (1990) (noting that there are three categories of executive agreements).
Between 1946 and 1972, only 6.2% of all international agreements concluded by
the United States were concluded as treaties. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH, supra,
(107)
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most common of the three types is the executive-congressional
agreement. 3
Executive-congressional agreements are unique in that they require
the assent of a majority of both houses of Congress, as opposed to the two-
thirds supermajority of the Senate that is required to implement a treaty.4
Executive-congressional agreements also differ in that, more often than
not, Congress approves them after their creation via the President's execu-
tive agreement.5
In 1995, on the basis of the President's authority to enter into execu-
tive agreements, the President of the United States entered into an execu-
tive agreement with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR"). 6 Under the terms of the agreement, the United States agreed
at 22. Of the remaining international agreements, 88.3% were concluded as exec-
utive-congressional agreements and 5.5% were concluded as executive agree-
ments. See id.
3. See TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE, S. REP. No. 205, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984) (noting that
executive-congressional agreements are most frequently concluded type of interna-
tional agreements).
4. See Randall, supra note 2, at 1094 (describing requirements of executive-
congressional agreements).
5. See id. (describing appeal process).
6. See Agreement on the Surrender of Persons Between the Government of the United
States and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide
and Other Serious Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Viola-
tions Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Jan. 24, 1995, U.S.-Int'l Trib.
Rwanda [hereinafter Agreement]. The executive agreement serves as a surrender
agreement between the United States and the ICTR. See id. It sets forth the condi-
tions and obligations that must be met before surrender will be granted to the
ICTR. See id.; see also Kenneth J. Harris & Robert Kushen, Prosecuting International
Crime: Surrender of Fugitives to the War Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia and Rwanda:
Squaring International Legal Obligations with the U.S. Constitution, 7 CRIM. L.F. 561,
581 (1996) (discussing executive agreements signed with Yugoslavia Tribunal and
Rwanda Tribunal on October 5, 1994 and January 24, 1995, respectively).
The Security Council of the United Nations established the Tribunal via Reso-
lution 955. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 3453rd meeting, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/50 (1994). The essence of the obligation on nations to surrender fugitives to
the Tribunal is expressed in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution:
[The Security Council] [d]ecides that all States shall cooperate fully with
the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present
resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and that conse-
quently all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic
law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Stat-
ute, including the obligation of States to comply with request for assist-
ance or orders issued by a Tribunal chamber under Article 28 of the
Statute.
Id. The Security Council derives the authority to create the tribunal from Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations. See U.N. CHARTER art. 12 (describing
source of authority). Under this chapter, the Security Council is given broad au-
thority with respect to threats to the peace and acts of aggression. See id. art. 39
(describing Security Council's authority). Furthermore, the Security Council is
given specific authority to decide what measures need to be taken to maintain or
[Vol. 45: p. 107
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to surrender, upon the ICTR's request, fugitives charged with the commis-
sion of crimes during the 1994 Rwandan civil war.7 In 1996, the ICTR
requested from the United States the surrender of Elizaphan Ntakiru-
timana, a Rwandan pastor accused of committing various crimes of geno-
cide.8 This marked the first time the tribunal requested the surrender of a
fugitive from the United States.9
This Note examines the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit's analysis of the constitutionality of the executive-congressional
agreement with the ICTR. Part II reviews the history of the Supreme
Court's decisions concerning the validity of executive-congressional agree-
ments and the function of the court on habeas corpus review.10 Part III
sets forth the relevant facts, as well as the legal arguments posited by
Ntakirutimana. 1 Part IV discusses the court's reasoning and legal analysis
in Ntakirutimana v. Reno.12 Part V addresses the impact that the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision may have on the future extraditability of fugitives based on
executive-congressional agreements.1 3
restore international peace and security. See id. art. 41 (noting authority of Secur-
ity Council). Under Article 48 of the Charter, "[t]he action required to carry out
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations ... ." Id. art. 48,
para. 1.
7. See Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1, cl. 1.
8. See Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing
facts of case). The specific obligation to surrender fugitives is found in Article 28
of the Rwandan Tribunal Statute, which reads as follows:
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal [for Rwanda] in
the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing
serious violations of international humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance
or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to:
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tri-
bunal [for Rwanda].
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, 1994
S.C. Res. & Dec. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1994) [hereinafter Statute].
9. See Harris & Kushen, supra note 6, at 561-62 (noting that Ntakirutimana was
first person requested for surrender by ICTR).
10. For further discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the
validity of executive-congressional agreements, see infra notes 14-66 and accompa-
nying text.
11. For further discussion of the facts and legal arguments posited by Ntakiru-
timana, see infra notes 67-92 and accompanying text.
12. 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999). For further discussion of the court's reason-
ing and legal analysis, see infra notes 93-198 and accompanying text.
13. For further discussion of the impact of the Fifth Circuit's decision on the
future extraditability of fugitives based on executive-congressional agreements, see
infra notes 199-212 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Treaty Power and The Validity of Executive-Congressional Agreements
1. The United States Constitution
Article II, section 2 of the United States Constitution grants the Presi-
dent the "[p]ower, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." 14 A
treaty is merely one method, albeit the least controversial, through which
the federal government may conclude international agreements. 15 An-
other method is through a majority vote of each house of Congress. 16
Congress derives this power from Article I, section 1, which grants legisla-
tive power to both houses of Congress: "All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." 17 Much debate exists
as to the validity of this type of international agreement.' 8
Aside from laying out the most basic aspects of entering into, imple-
menting and enforcing a treaty, the Constitution is somewhat lacking in
respect to treaties. 19 The references to treaties contained in the Constitu-
tion mainly serve the function of ensuring that the treaty power is reserved
to the federal government and not to the states.20 The lack of constitu-
tional guidance concerning treaties has led to debate over whether there
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
15. See Randall, supra note 2, at 1093-97 (discussing various types of intema-
tional agreements other than treaties).
16. See id. at 1094 (noting executive-congressional agreements require major-
ity vote of each house of Congress).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8.
18. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAF'A Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REv. 801, 804 (1995) (analyzing constitutionality of executive-congres-
sional agreements and specifically focusing on constitutionality of NAFTA); Lau-
rence Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1221, 1225-28 (1995) (criticizing va-
lidity of executive-congressional agreements).
19. See U.S. CONST., art. II (establishing requirements for creation of treaty).
Article II of the Constitution states that the President may enter into treaties with
the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. See id. art. II, § 2 (enumerating
executive power). Article IV extends the judicial power to all cases arising under
treaties. See id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (enumerating judicial power). Article VI states
that treaties shall be the supreme law of the land. See id. art. VI, cl. 2 (discussing
status of treaties as law in United States).
20. See Randall, supra note 2, at 1089 ("These references to treaties are sparse
probably because the framers' primary objective was to ensure that the federal
government, not the states, possessed authority over international agreements.").
Article I of the Constitution states that "[n]o State shall enter into any treaty ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Article I sets forth the powers granted to the legisla-
tive branch. See id. art. I. The article specifically denies states the power to enter
into treaties, or other types of international agreements. See id. The article
thereby ensures that the individual states do not have the power to conclude inter-
national agreements. See id.
[Vol. 45: p. 107
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are types of agreements that can only be concluded as treaties to which the
Senate has given its advice and consent.2 1
a. Interpretivists
Two divergent views exist regarding the validity of executive-congres-
sional agreements. 22 Interpretivists advance the position that all interna-
tional agreements must be made in accordance with the treaty clause
contained in Article II, section 2.23 Hence, proponents of this theory be-
lieve that all executive-congressional agreements are unconstitutional be-
cause they are concluded without the advice and consent of two-thirds of
the Senate. 24 Interpretivists believe that only what is contained in the ex-
21. See Detlev F. Vagts, Comment, The Exclusive Treaty Power Revisited, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 40, 40 (1995) (discussing debate over whether Uruguay Round amend-
ments to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade should not be ratified except
through two-thirds vote of Senate). The debate over whether there are certain
types of agreements that should only be concluded as Article II treaties began in
the period after the world wars. See Arthur W. Rovine, Separation of Powers and
International Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L.J. 397, 406-09 (1977) (noting that de-
bate over validity of international agreements other than treaties grew in period
after World War II). It was during this period that more executive agreements
than treaties were being concluded. See id. at 406 (setting forth reasons why more
executive agreements were concluded after 1946). One reason is the increase in
the number of nations in the world after World War II. See id. (noting that in 1977
there were nearly 150 nations in existence). Another reason is that it was during
this period the United States "became a highly active participant in world politics."
Id. at 407. Finally, the nature of the United States' relations with foreign sover-
eigns is less formal, calling for less formal agreements. See id (positing that in
period after World War II United States' position in world politics required more,
and less formal, relations with foreign nations).
Because executive agreements do not require the advice and consent of the
Senate, they are "uniquely suited for situations where prompt agreement is re-
quired." Richard J. Erickson, The Making of Executive Agreements by the United States
Department of Defense: An Agenda for Progress, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 45, 59 (1995). Fur-
thermore, one commentator noted:
The president's powers are not susceptible of definition in advance.
Changes in power relations, the shifting nature of alliances and adver-
sarial postures, and most certainly, the rapid development of military
technologies mean that he must often act in ways that no one can foresee
even a day in advance, much less in the ages to come.
22. Robert H. Bork, Foreword to THE FETrERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CON-
STRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ix-xii (L. Gordon Crovitz &Jeremy B. Rabkin
eds., 1989).
See Randall, supra note 2, at 1093-96 (discussing debate between interpretivists
and noninterpretivists).
23. See id. at 1094 (discussing position held by interpretivists).
24. See id. (explaining interpretivist position); see also Raoul Berger, The Presi-
dential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1, 4-7 (1972) (setting forth
notion that President only has power expressly conferred by text of treaty clause);
Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 630
(1945) (stating that "[t]he Constitution is based on the theory that this is a govern-
ment of limited powers"); Peter L. Fitzgerald, Executive Agreements and the Intent
Behind the Treaty Power, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 766 (1975) ("[T]he presi-
dent's independent powers were, in the view of the founders, limited in such a way
5
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plicit language of the Constitution is valid.25 Because the only mention of
treaties is contained in the treaty clause, and the treaty clause mentions no
alternative type of international agreement, neither Congress nor the
President are granted constitutional authority to conclude agreements
other than treaties. 26
Interpretivists feel that in addition to unconstitutionally extending
the President's power, executive-congressional agreements confer an in-
supportable grant of power to the House of Representatives. 2 7 Pointing to
constitutional history, interpretivists argue that the intent of the Framers is
evident in the specific language of the Constitution. 28 In other words, if
the Framers intended for the consent of the House of Representatives to
be required to conclude a treaty, the treaty clause would require the Presi-
dent to obtain the consent of both houses of Congress instead of simply
the consent of the Senate. 29
b. Noninterpretivists
On the other side of the argument are the noninterpretivists. 30 Pro-
ponents of this view do not advance such a literal reading of the Constitu-
tion. 3 1 They propose that language contained in Article I, section 10
prohibiting states from entering into "any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a Foreign Power" is evidence that the Framers con-
templated the existence of international agreements other than treaties. 3 2
that the treaty process of Article II would remain the exclusive procedure for en-
tering into international agreements.").
25. See Berger, supra note 24, at 5 (noting that because term "negotiate" is not
found in treaty clause President's power is limited to obtaining advice and consent
of Senate in order to "make" treaty); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 24, at 765 ("The
statements of the founders show that the treaty power was intended to be 'carefully
guarded' and the exclusive means of making international agreements.").
26. See Randall, supra note 2, at 1094 (noting that extreme interpretivists hold
that treaties are only valid type of international agreements).
27. See id. at 1094-95 (positing that allowing executive-congressional agree-
ments unfoundedly enhances House of Representatives' power); see also Borchard,
supra note 24, at 625 (stating that to involve both houses of Congress in treaty-
making power contained in Constitution would be extreme change to
Constitution).
28. See id. n.28 (citing to FEDERA l1ST No. 75 at 452 for proposition that treaty-
making power is better reserved to Senate in view of their longer terms).
29. See Borchard, supra note 24, at 663 (stating that if both houses of Congress
were meant to be included in treaty clause, language of Constitution would say
"Congress" instead of "Senate").
30. See Randall, supra note 2, at 1095 (discussing position held by
noninterpretivists).
31. See id. (stating that noninterpretivists do not focus on specific language of
Constitution).
32. Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pt. 1), 54 YALE
L.J. 181, 221 (1945) (noting that Article I, § 10 is significant because it shows Fram-
ers recognized existence of other types of international agreements).
[Vol. 45: p. 107
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The heart of the noninterpretivists' argument lies in the state of mod-
ern foreign affairs.33 Noninterpretivists hold the view that due to the ne-
cessity and frequency with which international agreements are concluded
in modern times, concluding and ratifying international agreements
through the treaty clause is too time-consuming.3 4  Furthermore,
noninterpretivists believe that the true intent of the Framers was to set up
a majoritarian process.3 5 Thus, a majority vote of each house of Congress
authorizing an executive agreement is in line with the intent of the
Framers.
36
2. Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the validity of execu-
tive agreements and executive-congressional agreements. 37 In Altman &
Co. v. United States,38 the Supreme Court recognized that certain interna-
tional compacts do not require the advice and consent of the Senate, and
thus upheld the executive agreement in question.3 9 The Court failed,
however, to identify what type of international compacts did not require a
treaty. 40 This question was partially answered by the Court in Valentine v.
United States.
41
33. See id. at 261-306 (stating that modern international relations require flex-
ibility afforded by executive-congressional agreements).
34. See id. (explaining noninterpretivists' approach of favoring efficiency over
exact language).
35. See id. at 216-26 (proposing that United States was founded on principles
of majority rule and participation of both Houses of Congress in implementing
international agreements is truer representation of people).
36. See id. (positing that executive-congressional agreements are consistent
with Framers' intent).
37. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-80 (1981) (uphold-
ing validity of executive agreements); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. L. F. Sabbatino,
376 U.S.. 398, 462 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (recognizing validity of executive
agreements); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15 (1957) (upholding executive agree-
ment in process of handing down judgement in case); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 223 (1942) (holding that all international agreements are to be treated
equally); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (holding that execu-
tive agreements are on same footing as treaties concluded under treaty clause);
Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912) (upholding validity of
"compact authorized by the Congress of the United States [and] negotiated and
proclaimed under the authority of its President").
38. 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
39. See id. at 601 (stating that commercial agreement made under Tariff Act
of 1897 was not treaty requiring ratification).
40. See id. (failing to specify what international compacts are not treaties re-
quiring ratification). The issue before the Supreme Court in Altman was whether
an agreement is a treaty unless made by the President and ratified by the Senate, as
required by the treaty clause in Article II. See id. at 583. The Court merely held
that even though the commercial agreement in question was a treaty, it was a valid
international compact. See id. at 601. The Court failed to specify what type of
international agreements do not have to be concluded as treaties. See id.
41. 299 U.S. 5 (1936). The issue before the Court in Valentine was whether an
extradition treaty between France and the United States conferred power on the
NOTE
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The controlling Supreme Court decision pertaining to extradition is
Valentine.42 In that case, the Court upheld the extradition of fugitives
based on executive-congressional agreements. 4 3 The question before the
Supreme Court in Valentine was whether fugitives who were citizens of the
United States could be extradited to France for crimes committed there,
pursuant to an extradition treaty that excepted citizens of the United
States.44 The Court held that because the President's power to extradite
was conferred by a treaty, the treaty must confer the power to extradite
United States citizens in order for them to be extradited. 45 Because the
treaty failed to grant the necessary authority, the fugitives were not
extraditable.
4 6
In reaching its conclusion, the Court first recognized the clearly es-
tablished principle that the power to extradite is one belonging to the
federal government and not to the states. 4 7 Albeit a national power, it is
not unlimited.4 8 The Court qualified the power to extradite by noting
that the executive can only exercise this power pursuant to a treaty or
executive to surrender one of its own citizens. See id. at 10. France had requested
the extradition of two United States citizens found guilty of committing crimes in
France. See id. at 6. The Court examined the language of the extradition treaty to
determine whether the treaty conferred power on the executive to surrender one
of its own citizens. See id. at 10. The Court found that the treaty contained explicit
language stating that neither country shall be bound to surrender its own citizens.
See id. The Court posited that although, as a general rule, it is desirable to liberally
construe the obligations of treaties to give effect to the apparent intention of the
parties, this is no substitute for authority conferred by the law. See id.; see, e.g.,
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933) (holding that when two inter-
pretations of treaty are possible, narrow one should be avoided);Jordan v. Tashiro,
278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928) (noting that when treaty has two meanings, broader one
should be applied); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902) (holding that
treaties should be interpreted broadly to give effect to their intent). The Valentine
Court held that denying an obligation is not equivalent to a grant of power. See
Valentine, 299 U.S. at 10-11 (stating that history and practice do not support grant
of implied discretionary power).
42. See Valentine, 299 U.S. at 8-10 (setting forth rules pertaining to
extradition).
43. See id. at 8-9 (holding that extradition is valid if power to surrender is
conferred on executive by legislative provision).
44. See id. at 6 (stating issue before Court).
45. See id. at 18 (setting forth holding of Court).
46. See id. (holding that President could not surrender respondents because
treaty with France fails to grant necessary authority).
47. See id. at 8 (citing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 412-14 (1886) for
proposition that extradition is national power). This prohibition on the states is
contained in Article 1, § 10 of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. ART. 1, § 10 ("No
State shall enter into any Treaty . . . Agreement or Compact with another
State .... ); see also Randall, supra note 2, at 1089 (proposing that primary objec-
tive of references in Constitution to treaties is to ensure that states do not enter
into them).
48. See Valentine, 299 U.S. at 8 (noting limits on executive's power to
extradite).
[Vol. 45: p. 107
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legislative provision. 49 Thus, as long as the power to surrender is author-
ized by law, there is no requirement that the power to extradite must be
conferred by treaty.50 The conventional or legislative provision from
which the power to extradite is derived must specifically grant the power
to surrender to the executive. 51 It is insufficient for the conventional or
legislative provision to simply not deny the power to surrender.
52
The Court, therefore, established the principle that the power to ex-
tradite a fugitive does not need to be conferred by treaty.53 The Court
recognized the validity of a legislative provision conferring a grant of
power upon the executive to extradite a fugitive.
54
B. Habeas Corpus Review
In Collins v. Loisel,55 the Supreme Court held that the function of the
committing court in extradition proceedings is "to determine whether
there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial,
and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a convic-
tion."5 6 The decision of the committing court is not appealable by the
government or by the defendant.57 The government, however, is free to
reinstitute an extradition request if the first request is denied.58 The only
means by which the defendant may seek review of the committing court's
decision is by filing a habeas corpus petition.
59
49. See id. at 8-9 (citing 1 JOHN BAssETT MOORE, MooRE ON EXTRADITION 21
(1974)).
50. See id. (analyzing extradition power).
51. See id. at 9 (requiring that executive be given specific power to extradite).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 8-10 (holding that power to extradite can either be conferred by
treaty or legislative provision).
54. See id. (recognizing legislative provision granting power to extradite).
55. 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
56. Id. at 316; see Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 197 (1902) (holding that guilt is
for requesting jurisdiction to determine); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 462-
63 (1888) (holding that main function of habeas corpus petition is for court to
consider if evidence justifies surrendering fugitive and not if evidence establishes
guilt).
57. See Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1920) ("But the proceeding before
a committing magistrate in international extradition is not subject to correction by
appeal.").
Extradition requests are not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1994). Section 1291 states that "[t]he jurisdiction of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction de-
scribed in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title." Id.; see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1292 (c) and (d), 1295.
58. See In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1325 (1st Cir. 1993) (not-
ing that government may institute second extradition request if first one is de-
nied); see also United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 502 (2d Cir. 1986) (same);
Gusikoff v. United States, 620 F.2d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Hooker v.
Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1978) (same).
59. See United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 107-08 (1997) (stating
that only option for defendant is to file habeas corpus petition); see alsoJohn G.
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The function of the habeas corpus petition "is to determine whether
there is any competent evidence tending to show probable cause."60 Ex-
tradition proceedings are designed to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient for the accused to stand trial and not to determine whether the
evidence is sufficient to convict. 6' In Loisel, the Supreme Court held that
if the committing court assumed the responsibility of examining the
weight and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the credibility of the wit-
nesses' testimony, "'the foreign government.., would be compelled to go
into a full trial on the merits in a foreign country, under all the disadvan-
tages of such a situation, and could not obtain extradition until after it
had procured a conviction of the accused upon a full and substantial trial
here.' 6
2
In its probable cause finding, the committing court does not engage
in fact finding.6 ' Thus, the reviewing court will uphold the committing
court's probable cause finding if it is supported by any competent evi-
dence in the record.64 The Supreme Court has stated that proof sufficient
to substantiate that the person charged with having committed the crime
actually committed it established probable cause. 65 Thus, if "the judg-
ment of the [committing judge is] rendered in good faith on legal evi-
dence that the accused is guilty of the act charged . . . [then the
Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1472 (1988)
("The accused then may bring an action for habeas corpus to test the legality of his
detention."). There is some authority, however, that a defendant may challenge a
finding of extraditability via a declaratory judgment action. See, e.g., Sayne v.
Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, n.17 (5th Cir. 1969); Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602 (5th
Cir. 1965).
60. Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1980); see also
Loisel 259 U.S. at 314-15 (stating that function of Court is to determine if sufficient
legal evidence exists to justify surrender); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 460
(1913) (noting that Court's function is to determine if evidence is sufficient to
justify surrender); McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U.S. 520, 523 (1913) ("The question
simply is whether there was any competent evidence before the Commissioner en-
titling him to act under the statute."); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d
1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that function of habeas corpus petition is to
determine if competent evidence exists to support finding of probable cause);
Sayne, 418 F.2d at 684-86 (holding that habeas corpus petition is always available to
fugitive despite absence of such requirement in governing statute); Jacques Sem-
melman, Federal Courts, The Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquity in International
Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1198, 1203 (1991) ("Habeas corpus re-
view tests the legality, as opposed to the wisdom, of extradition.").
61. See Loisel, 259 U.S. at 316 (stating that it is not necessary for evidence to be
sufficient to convict).
62. Id. (quoting Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461).
63. See United States v. Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 205 (1989) (stating that habeas
corpus review is not rehearing).
64. See McNamara, 226 U.S. at 523 (holding that committing court's finding
will be upheld if finding of facts is based on sufficient evidence).
65. See Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 512 (1896) (noting what constitutes
probable cause).
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judgment] cannot be reviewed on the weight of the evidence, and is fi-
nal . . .unless palpably erroneous in law." 66
III. EuzAPHAN NTAKIRUTIMANA V. JANET RENO
In 1994, Rwanda was the scene of a bloody civil war between two eth-
nic Rwandan tribes, the Hutus and the Tutsis.6 7 At the time, Rwanda was
under the leadership of President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, thereby
placing the Hutus in the majority.68 Although there had been conflict
between the tribes for many years, there was a resurgence of attacks
against the Tutsis by the Hutus in April 1994.69 The impetus for the vio-
lence was the death of President Habyarimana, which resulted when his
plane crashed due to an artillery attack. 70 The civil strife ended with a
Tutsi dominated government emerging victorious, and nearly one million
people, mostly Tutsis, dead.7 1
An investigation by the United Nations into the crimes committed by
the Hutu tribe, at the request of the Tutsi dominated government, re-
vealed that the violations committed against the Tutsis by the Hutus were
motivated by ethnic hatred.7 2 The findings of this investigation resulted
in the establishment of the ICTR.7 3 President Clinton entered into an
executive agreement with the ICTR on January 24, 1995, in which the
United States agreed to surrender indicted individuals found on its terri-
66. Id. at 509.
67. See Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing
history of Rwandan civil conflict).
68. See id. (noting that Rwanda was under leadership of President
Habyarimana).
69. See id. (noting resurgence of attacks in 1994).
70. See id. (describing death of President Habyarimana).
71. See id. (stating that Tutsis emerged victorious from civil war against
Hutus).
72. See id.; see e.g., Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., A Court of Our Own Making, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 10, 1998, at 5 (stating that Hutu slaughter of more than half
million Tutsi was genocide); Nathan Koppel & Jane Elliott, U.S. Pushes to Expel
Rwandan for War Crimes; Tribunal Wants Pastor Tried for Alleged Genocide, TEX. LAW.,
Apr. 12, 1999, at 1 (noting genocide of ethnic Tutsis during Rwandan civil war in
1994).
73. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 422 (discussing creation of ICTR). The in-
ternational tribunal was established by Security Council Resolution 955. See Statute,
supra note 8 (establishing international tribunal). The ICTR, headquartered in
Arusha, Tanzania, was created on November 8, 1994. See id. The tribunal is lim-
ited to the prosecution and punishment of those people responsible for crimes of
genocide between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994. See id. The statute of
the ICTR is contained in an annex to the resolution. See id. The ICTR is the first
international criminal tribunal to prosecute for the crime of genocide. See Report of
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tory.7 4 Congress enacted legislation to implement the executive agree-
ment in 1996.
7 5
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana is a Rwandan citizen and a member of the
Hutu tribe. 76 In April 1994, Ntakirutimana served as President of the
Rwandan Seventh Day Adventist Church, based in a church complex in
Mugonero, Gishyita Commune, Kibuye Prefecture, Rwanda. 77 Since that
time, he had been living with his son in Laredo, Texas. 78 In 1996, the
ICTR returned two indictments against Ntakirutimana. 79 The first indict-
ment, on June 20, 1996, charged Ntakirutimana with crimes of genocide,
conspiracy to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes against hu-
manity and serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conven-
tions and of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. 80 The
ICTR alleged that Ntakirutimana was responsible for the preparation and
execution of a plan to encourage Tutsis to seek refuge in the Mugonero
church complex.8 ' Once there, the Tutsis were slaughtered by machete
74. See generally Agreement, supra note 6 (stating under what circumstances
United States agreed to surrender indicted individuals). For a discussion of the
executive agreement between the United States and the criminal tribunal, see
supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
75. See National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-06,
§ 1342, 110 Stat. 486 (1996). In enacting this legislation, the United States became
the twelfth nation to modify its domestic laws to ensure compliance with the Secur-
ity Council's resolution. See Robert Kushen & Kenneth J. Harris, Current Develop-
ment: Surrender of Fugitives by the United States to the War Crimes Tribunals for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 90 AM. J. Iur'L L. 510, 510 (1996). Chapter 209 of Title 18
of the United States Code was amended to implement the Agreement. See id. at
515. Contained in Chapter 209 are provisions addressing critical aspects of extra-
dition practice not normally governed by bilateral extradition treaties, notably
§§ 3184, 3186, 3188, 3190-91 and 3195-96. See id. The chapter was amended to
apply to the surrender of offenders to international tribunals. See id. This amend-
ment was needed because tribunals are not sovereign states. See id. The affect of
the amendment was to provide authority to the Secretary of State to surrender
fugitives in accordance with resolutions of the Security Council. See id. at 516.
Relevant sections of the implementing legislation are §§ 3186 and 3196. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 3186, 3196 (1996). Section 3186 confers final authority upon the
Secretary of State to surrender fugitives as to whom U.S. courts have ruled that the
requirements for extradition have been met, while § 3196 permits the surrender of
United States citizens even where the applicable treaty does not oblige the United
States to do so. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3186, 3196.
76. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 422 (noting that Ntakirutimana is Rwandan
citizen and member of Hutu tribe).
77. See id. A commune is equivalent to a county in the United States and a
prefecture is equivalent to a state in the United States. See id. at n.4.
78. See id. at 423 (noting that Ntakirutimana had been living in Texas with his
son since 1994).
79. See id. at 422 (detailing indictments against Ntakirutimana).
80. See id. (describing first indictment).
81. See id. (specifying allegations against Ntakirutimana).
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and small arms fire.8 2 On June 21, 1996, the indictment was confirmed by
a Tribunal judge, and an arrest warrant was issued for Ntakirutimana. 83
On September 7, 1998, a second indictment was confirmed, and an-
other arrest warrant issued, charging Ntakirutimana with additional viola-
tions of the same crimes.8 4 The events to which these crimes pertain took
place in the area to where the survivors of the first massacre had fled-the
Bisesero region.
8 5
In September 1996, pursuant to the ICTR request for Ntakirutimana's
extradition, the federal government filed its first request in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for Ntakirutimana's
surrender to the ICTR.8 6 The Magistrate Judge denied the request for
surrender based on independent, alternative reasons: first, the judge
found that the federal statute authorizing Ntakirutimana's surrender to
the Tribunal was an unconstitutional assignment of authority to the extra-
dition judge because extradition requires an Article II treaty; and second,
that the federal Government's request and supporting documentation did
not establish probable cause.8 7
On January 29, 1998, the Government refiled its request for surren-
der seeking review by a different judge in the Laredo division for the
Southern District of Texas.88 The district court certified the surrender to
the ICTR, holding that the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996
was constitutional and provided a basis for the extradition of Ntakiru-
timana.8 9 Ntakirutimana filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 challenging the district court's grant of the Government's second
82. See id. (listing reasons for denying request for surrender); see, e.g., Barbara
Crossette, Rwandan in Genocide Case Makes Last Appeal to Stay in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 1999, at A10 (discussing massacre of Tutsis by Hutus); Michael Kirkland,
U.S. to Court: Ease Rwandan Extradition, UNITED PRESS INTrr'L, Aug. 19, 1999, at 1
(same).
83. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 422-23; see also In re Surrender of Ntakiru-
timana, No. CIV.A.L-98-43, 1998 WL 655708, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 1998) (dis-
cussing factual background of case).
84. See In re Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708, at *1.
85. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 423 (discussing area where events pertain-
ing to crime took place).
86. See id. (describing first request for surrender).
87. See id. (discussing National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 and setting
forth reasons first request for surrender was denied).
88. See In re Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708, at *2. The Government added
two declarations to establish the probable cause needed to sustain the charges in
the tribunal's indictments. See id.
89. See Ntakirutimana, 183 F.3d at 423. The district court found that the Con-
stitution sets forth no specific requirements for extradition. See In re Ntakiru-
timana, 1998 WL 655708, at *2. The court further held that the Supreme Court
has indicated its approval of extraditions made in the absence of a treaty and that
there is precedent wherein fugitives were extradited pursuant to statutes that filled
the gap left by a treaty provision. See id. The court held that the evidence brought
forth by the Government sufficed to establish probable cause for the charges
against Ntakirutimana. See id. at *8.
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request for surrender. 90 The district court denied his habeas corpus peti-
tion, and Ntakirutimana appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit.
9 1
Ntakirutimana appealed the district court's decision alleging that: (1)
the Constitution of the United States requires an Article II treaty for the
surrender of a person to the ICTR; (2) the request for surrender does not
establish probable cause; (3) the United Nations Charter does not author-
ize the Security Council to establish the ICTR; and (4) the ICTR is not
capable of protecting fundamental rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution and international law.92
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
The Fifth Circuit, in reviewing the decision of the district court, ad-
dressed only the first two issues raised by Ntakirutimana on appeal.93 The
issues addressed by the court were whether the Constitution requires an
Article II treaty for the surrender of a person to the ICTR and whether the
request for surrender establishes probable cause.9 4 The court refused to
review the remaining two issues raised by Ntakirutimana: whether the
United Nations Charter authorizes the Security Council to establish the
ICTR and whether the ICTR is capable of protecting fundamental rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and international law.95
1. The Requirement of an Article II Treaty for Extradition
Ntakirutimana posited a number of arguments in raising the issue of
whether the Constitution requires an Article II treaty for extradition. 96
First, he argued that the language of the Constitution specifically requires
an Article II treaty for extradition. 97 Second, Ntakirutimana raised the
argument that it was the intent of the Framers to require a treaty for extra-
dition. 98 Third, he argued that it is historical practice to require a treaty
to extradite, in that a person has never been extradited in the absence of
an Article II treaty. 99 Fourth, Ntakirutimana argued that the failure to
require a treaty is a violation of separation of powers. 10 0 Fifth, Ntakiru-
timana asserted that a statute cannot usurp the treaty-making power of
90. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 419 (stating that Ntakirutimana filed habeas
corpus petition).
91. See id. (noting that habeas corpus petition was denied).
92. See id. (listing reasons Ntakirutimana appealed).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 424-27
95. See id. at 427-30
96. See id. at 424-27
97. See id. at 424
98. See id. at
99. See id. at 426
100. See id.
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Article 11.101 Finally, he argued that by not requiring an Article II treaty
for extradition, the treaty-making power is read out of the Constitution. 10 2
a. Text of the Constitution
In reviewing this issue, the Fifth Circuit first examined the United
States Constitution. 10 3 Ntakirutimana argued that according to Article II,
Section 2, Clause 2, a treaty is required to extradite. 10 4 Upon examination
of this provision of the Constitution, the court found that it does not con-
tain specific language referring to extradition or to the necessity of a treaty
in order to extradite.10 5
The court then turned to decisions of the Supreme Court. 10 6 The
court found that the power to surrender a fugitive to a foreign country is
contained within the President's foreign relations power.10 7 Relying on
the Supreme Court's decision in Valentine, the Fifth Circuit qualified the
executive's power to surrender fugitives.10 8 In Valentine, the Court held
that the power to surrender is not unlimited.10 9 Rather, the power to ex-
tradite must be granted by law, either through an act of Congress or by the
terms of a treaty. 1 0 The Court further qualified the executive's power to
extradite by stating that the statute or treaty must confer the power, it is
101. See id
102. See id. at 427
103. See id. at 424. Because Ntakirutimana's challenge to the constitutionality
of the statute is a challenge to the committing court's jurisdiction, the court re-
viewed the issue of constitutionality de novo. See id. (citing Manrique Carreno v.
Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 624, 629 (S.D. Fla. 1995)).
104. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur.. . ."); see also Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 424.
105. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 424 (examining language of United States
Constitution).
106. See id. (examining Supreme Court decisions).
107. See id. ("The power to surrender is clearly included within the treaty-
making power and the corresponding power of appointing and receiving ambassa-
dors and other public ministers." (quoting Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289
(1902))).
108. SeeValentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 18 (1936) (holding that power
to extradite must be conferred on executive by treaty or act of Congress). The
Supreme Court in Valentine, in reaching its holding, first stated that the power of
the executive to extradite fugitives must be conferred by treaty or by act of Con-
gress. See id. at 7. After establishing this principle, the Court examined the legisla-
tive provision relating to extradition. See id. at 9. The Court found that the
provision merely defines the procedures to be followed when there is an extradi-
tion treaty or act of Congress in existence. See id. The provision should not be
construed as conferring power on the executive to surrender a fugitive in the ab-
sence of a specific grant of power to do so. See id. at 10.
109. See id. at 8 (noting that although power to extradite is national power, it
must be granted by treaty or legislative provision).
110. See id. at 9 (examining whether legislative provision conferring authority
to extradite existed). The Court found that although there was a statutory provi-
sion referring to extradition, the provision did not explicitly confer power on the
executive to extradite. See id.
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insufficient for the statute or treaty to simply not deny the power to
surrender.Il1
The United States does not have an extradition treaty with
Rwanda.11 2 Hence, in order for the executive to have the power to surren-
der, there must be a statute conferring the authority. 113 According to Val-
entine, the use of the executive-congressional agreement to extradite
Ntakirutimana is a constitutional use of power." 4 The court rejected
Ntakirutimana's attempts to distinguish his case from Valentine by pointing
to the lack of a treaty between Rwanda and the United States. 115 The
court also dismissed Ntakirutimana's assertion that Valentine challenged
the congressional authority to provide for the extradition of fugitives in
the absence of a treaty.' 6 The court held that although there is a limit on
the President's power to surrender a fugitive, there is no such limit on
Congress' power to provide for extradition. 117
b. Intent of the Framers
Failing on his previous arguments, Ntakirutimana made an independ-
ent argument that his interpretation of the Constitution was in line with
the intent of the Framers.1 18 He argued that the drafters of the Constitu-
tion intended for the executive to negotiate agreements with foreign pow-
ers and for the Senate to review the agreements as an exercise of the
checks and balances system. 1 19 The Fifth Circuit dismissed this argument,
111. See id. at 10 (stating that treaty did not confer power to surrender). In
Valentine, there was an extradition treaty in force between France and the United
States. See id. at 6. France had requested the extradition of two United States
citizens found guilty of committing crimes in France. See id. The Court examined
the language of the extradition treaty to determine whether the treaty conferred
power on the executive to surrender one of its own citizens. See id. at 10. The
Court found that the treaty contained explicit language stating that neither coun-
try shall be bound to surrender its own citizens. See id. The Court also stated that
although, as a general rule, it is desirable to liberally construe the obligations of
treaties to give effect to the apparent intention of the parties, this is no substitute
for authority conferred by the law. See id. The Court held that denying an obliga-
tion is not equivalent to a grant of power. See id.
112. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 421-24 (stating that issue before court is
whether executive-congressional agreement is constitutional because there is not
relevant treaty in effect).
113. See id. at 425 (stating that based on holding in Valentine, court should
look to treaty or statute for authority to extradite).
114. See id. (holding that use of executive-congressional agreements to extra-
dite is constitutional).
115. See id. (rejecting Ntakirutimana's attempts to distinguish his case from
Valentine).
116. See id. (dismissing Ntakirutimana's assertion).
117. See id. (citing Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936), for proposi-
tion that no limit exists on Congress' power).
118. See id. (discussing Ntakirutimana's argument that his interpretation of
Constitution is in line with intent of drafters).
119. See id. (discussing intent of Framers to establish system of checks and
balances).
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holding that it failed because it is based on the assumption that a treaty is
required for an international agreement.
120
c. Historical Practice
Ntakirutimana based his third argument on historical practice.
1 2 1
Citing Valentine, he argued that the United States has never surrendered a
person in the absence of an Article II treaty.122 Furthermore, he posited
that according to Valentine the only involuntary transfers without an extra-
dition treaty have been to a foreign country or territory occupied by or
under the control of the United States. 123 The Fifth Circuit refuted this
argument by referring to the Court's analysis in Valentine.124 In that case,
although reference was made to this historical practice, the Supreme
Court did not suggest that it limited Congress' power.125 The Fifth Circuit
suggested instead that if historical practice tells us anything, it is that there
is a historical understanding that Congress may exercise the power to ex-
tradite by statute. 126
120. See id. In dismissing this argument, the court points to the validity of
executive agreements, and the necessity of the President to enter into binding
agreements with foreign nations. See id. at 426. For a discussion of the constitu-
tionality of executive agreements and executive-congressional agreements, see
supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
121. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 426 (stating Ntakirutimana's third
argument).
122. See id. (citing Valentine, 299 U.S. at 9 for proposition that fugitive has
never been surrendered without Article II treaty).
123. See id. (noting Ntakirutimana's argument that involuntary transfers only
occur in limited situations).
124. See id. (discussing analysis of Court in Valentine). For a discussion of the
facts and holding of Valentine, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
125. See id. In its analysis, the Court in Valentine quoted John Bassett Moore
from his treatise on extradition: "the general opinion has been, and practice has
been in accordance with it, that in the absence of a conventional or legislative
provision there is no authority vested in any department of the government to
seize a fugitive criminal and surrender him to a foreign power." Valentine, 299 U.S.
at 8-9 (citing MooRE, supra note 49, at 21). The Court held that precedent clearly
did not place a limit on Congress' power. See id. at 9 (noting historical practice).
Rather, examining precedent shows that extradition in accordance with a treaty or
a legislative provision is valid. See id. (stating that proceedings against individual
must be authorized by law).
126. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 426 (noting historical practice). Supreme
Court precedent illustrates a historical understanding that Congress may extradite
by statute. See, e.g., Valentine, 299 U.S. at 18 ("[W]e ... hold that [the President's]
power, in the absence of statute conferring an independent power, must be found
in the terms of the treaty . . . ."); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 191 (1902) ("But
notwithstanding such treaty, Congress has a perfect right to provide for the extra-
dition of criminals in its own way, with or without a treaty to that effect .... );
Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902) ("In the United States, the general
opinion and practice have been that extradition should be declined in the absence
of a conventional or legislative provision."). The Fifth Circuit further posited that
the historical understanding that Congress may extradite by statute exists irrespec-
tive of the fact that Congress has rarely exercised the power to do so. See Ntakiru-
timana, 184 F.3d at 426. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit pointed to Hilario v. United
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d. Separation of Powers
Ntakirutimana further contended that not requiring an Article II
treaty for extradition constitutes a violation of the Constitution's separa-
tion of powers. 127 He asserted that in the absence of a treaty requirement,
the President has the power to unilaterally conclude agreements with for-
eign governments. 128 He also contended that Congress has the power to
legislate foreign affairs, a power enumerated in the Constitution as be-
longing to the executive.
129
The Fifth Circuit held that Ntakirutimana's argument was without
merit. 130 The Supreme Court has recognized the President's authority to
enter into executive agreements. 131 Through the exercise of this power,
the President can unilaterally conclude agreements with foreign govern-
ments. 132 Furthermore, this case deals with an executive-congressional
agreement. 3 3 This type of agreement is concluded through the joint acts
States, 854 F. Supp. 165,168 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), in which the court held that even in a
case where the fugitive would not be extraditable under the specific terms of the
treaty, a fugitive may be extradited pursuant to a statute that "filled the gap" in the
treaty. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 426. Thus, the court concluded that
although historical practice has been to extradite according to a treaty, this does
not preclude extradition pursuant to a legislative provision. See id.
127. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 426 (discussing Ntakirutimana's various
arguments concerning constitutionality of grant of surrender request without Arti-
cle II treaty). The doctrine of separation of powers suggests that there are three
separate, but coordinated branches, each having independent power. See Arthur
Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitu-
tion Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. Rv. 527, 534-37 (1974) (discussing real
meaning of separation of powers). The purpose of the separation of powers doc-
trine is "to require the joint participation-the co-operation and concurrence-of
the several branches in the making and carrying out of any genuinely critical deci-
sion." Id. at 535. It was the intent of the Framers for each branch of the govern-
ment to serve as a check on the other branches of government. See id. at 536-37.
In the area of foreign affairs the purpose served by the separation of powers doc-
trine is to ensure that "the making and carrying out of foreign policy is not the
prerogative of any one branch of government." Id. at 538. See generally Edward H.
Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. Rv. 371 (1976) (discussing
at length seperation of powers.)
128. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 426.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981) (recognizing
President's power to enter into executive agreements); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (upholding validity of executive agreements); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (recognizing that certain international agree-
ments can be concluded on sole authority of President); Altman & Co. v. United
States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-01 (1911) (upholding validity of international agreements
concluded without advice and consent of Senate).
132. For a discussion of the President's ability to unilaterally conclude agree-
ments with foreign governments, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
133. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 422 (discussing executive-congressional
agreement with ICTR).
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of the executive and congressional branches.1 3 4 The President does not
act unilaterally, nor does Congress negotiate with foreign countries.
135
Therefore, the question of separation of powers does not arise.1
3 6
e. A Statute Versus the Treaty-Making Power
Ntakirutimana's argument that a statute cannot usurp the treaty-mak-
ing power of Article II has been refuted since Whitney v. Robertson.137 In
that case, the Supreme Court held that a statute can usurp a treaty.13 8
Known as the "last in time" rule, it stands for the proposition that if a
statute and treaty are inconsistent, then the last in time will prevail.1
3 9
The Fifth Circuit extrapolated from this holding that if the Supreme
Court assumes that a statute and a treaty can be inconsistent, then there
134. See id. at 426 (stating method for concluding executive-congressional
agreements).
135. See id. (noting that President does not act unilaterally and Congress does
not negotiate with foreign countries).
136. See generally Bestor, supra note 127 (discussing separation of powers). A
violation of separation of powers occurs when one branch of the government im-
pinges upon the functions of another. See Levi, supra note 127, at 382 (discussing
what constitutes violation of separation of powers). Attorney General Levi made
two points in his article:
First, whether power has been rightly exercised, or exercised within the
limits the Constitution defines, is not always a problem of separation of
powers. Some powers have been confided to no branch. Abuse of power
in that context may mean that the limes should be enforced on all
branches of government, not that the power is better conferred on and
exercised by a branch other than that which has abused it. A corollary of
this is that a weakness in one branch of the government is not always best
corrected by weakening another branch.
Second, and perhaps most remarkable, is that the cases which to
some extent define the allocation of power among the branches are rela-
tively few. That fact is a testament to the respect that each branch gener-
ally has maintained for the powers and responsibilities of the others, and
to an understanding that each branch, within its sphere, represents and
serves the people's interest.
Id. at 385-86.
137. 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that if there is treaty and statute deal-
ing with same subject then last in time will prevail, if treaty is self-executing). In
Whitney, a legislative provision was enacted subsequent to a treaty, both dealing
with the same subject. See id. at 193-94. The provisions of the statute conflicted
with the provisions of the treaty. See id. at 191. The Court held that "[b]y the
Constitution of the United States a treaty and a statute are placed on the same
footing, and if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control, provided
the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing." Id. at 190. In recog-
nizing that a statute and treaty can be inconsistent, the Court was in effect recog-
nizing that there can be a statute and treaty dealing with the same subject. See
Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 426 (determining from Court's analysis in Whitney that
there can be statute and treaty dealing with same subject).
138. See Whitney, 124 U.S at 194 (holding that statute can usurp treaty).
139. See id. (holding that "if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will
control the other").
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can be a statute and a treaty that cover the same subject. 1 40 Therefore, the
executive-congressional agreement at issue, codified in the statute, was a
valid exercise of authority.1 4 1
f. The Treaty Power is not Affected
Finally, Ntakirutimana argued that by not requiring a treaty for extra-
dition, the treaty-making power is read out of the Constitution. 42 The
Fifth Circuit found that this argument had no legal basis. 143 Not requir-
ing a treaty does not affect the treaty-making power contained in the Con-
stitution.144 It only means that the President has discretion to determine
whether to submit a negotiated treaty to the Senate for ratification or to
submit legislation to Congress. 1 45 Utilizing one method instead of the
other does not affect the power of the President to use the other method
at a subsequent time.146 In fact, should the President choose to submit
legislation to Congress instead of submitting a treaty for ratification, Con-
gress may refuse to consider the legislation and insist that the agreement
be submitted as a treaty instead. 14 7 Therefore, in refuting all of Ntakiru-
timana's arguments, the court concluded that it is not unconstitutional to
surrender Ntakirutimana to the ICTR pursuant to the executive-congres-
sional agreement. 148
2. Failure to Establish the Requisite Probable Cause for Surrender
The second issue brought by Ntakirutimana, and addressed by the
Fifth Circuit on appeal, was whether the district court erred in dismissing
his habeas corpus petition. 149 In extradition proceedings, the evidence
must be sufficient to meet a constitutional probable cause standard.' 50
Under the terms of the executive-congressional agreement, the ICTR is
required to present "information sufficient to establish that there is a rea-
sonable basis to believe that the person sought has committed the viola-
140. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 427 (interpreting Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Whitne).
141. See id. (holding that executive-congressional agreement is
constitutional).
142. See id. (setting forth Ntakirutimana's final argument).
143. See id. (finding no legal basis for Ntakirutimana's argument).
144. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303
cmt. e (1986)).
145. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 303
cmt. e (1986)).
146. See id. (noting that using one method over another does not affect
method not chosen).
147. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 303
cmt. e (1986)).
148. See id. (stating holding).
149. See id. (presenting second issue).
150. See id. (describing what constitutes sufficiency of evidence). For a discus-
sion of the constitutional probable cause standard, see supra notes 60-66 and ac-
companying text.
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tion or violations for which surrender is requested.1 51 The Fifth Circuit
held that the committing court, in this case the district court, must only
determine whether probable cause exists to sustain the charges. 152 The
committing court must make this determination based on the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence. 153 This determination is not a finding of fact
because the court does not weigh the evidence in order to resolve factual
disputes. 154
The function of the Fifth Circuit on habeas corpus review was limited
to a determination of whether there was any competent evidence in the
record to support a finding of probable cause.155 The circuit court ex-
amined evidence presented to the district court and found that all of the
documents were admissible as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3190.156 The first
151. Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 427 (citing Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2, cl.
3).
152. See id. (citing Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir.
1980)).
153. For a discussion of the probable cause standard in extradition proceed-
ings, see supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of the probable cause standard in extradition proceed-
ings, see supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
155. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 314-15 (1922) (stating that function of
Court is to determine if there is competent legal evidence); Charlton v. Kelly, 229
U.S. 447, 460 (1913) (noting Court's function of determining sufficiency of evi-
dence); McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U.S. 520, 523 (1913) ("The question simply is
whether there was any competent evidence before the Commissioner entitling him
to act under the statute."); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th
Cir. 1980) (noting function of court is to determine if evidence is sufficient to
constitute probable cause); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192
(5th Cir. 1971) (stating that function of habeas corpus petition is to determine if
competent evidence exists to support finding of probable cause).
156. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d. at 427 (noting circuit court's finding of ad-
missibility). The evidence presented at the extradition hearing consisted of three
documents. See id. (noting evidence). The first document was the declaration of
Arjen Mostert, a police officer from Holland employed as an investigator for the
Tribunal in 1996. See In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, No. CIV.A.L-98-43, 1998
WL 655708, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 1998) (describing Mostert). His declaration
consisted of the testimony of 12 witnesses who claimed to have firsthand knowl-
edge of Ntakirutimana's participation in or planning of the attacks. See Ntakiru-
timana, 184 F.3d at 427 (noting content of testimony). A challenge to his
declaration by both Ntakirutimana and the magistrate judge led Mostert to later
qualify his declaration by removing the testimony of two witnesses who had pro-
vided only general information. See In re Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708, at *18
n.7 (describing supplemental declaration). Mostert's declaration set forth the fac-
tual background of the events in Rwanda during the 1994 civil war. See id. at *18
(describing tensions and circumstances precipitating civil war). It also set forth
specific evidence that Ntakirutimana committed the genocidal crimes with which
he was charged. See id. (describing evidence).
The remaining two documents were included as evidence in the second re-
quest for surrender. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 428 (discussing declarations).
The documents were added as a response to the first committing court's finding
that the evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause. See id. (noting that
additional declarations sustained probable cause requirement). The second docu-
ment was the declaration of Pierre-Richard Prosper, an assistant trial attorney for
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committing court held that the evidence was inadequate to establish prob-
able cause. 15 7 Thus, the Fifth Circuit closely examined the documents
presented to the second committing court that were used to supplement
the Government's evidence, and which served as the basis for the grant of
surrender. 158
Ntakirutimana challenged the credibility of the evidence, arguing
that the evidence presented against him lacked probative force and was
unreliable.159 The Fifth Circuit found that the credibility of the evidence
was an issue properly reviewable by the magistrate judge rather than by a
habeas corpus petition. 16° The court held that it would not review the
district court's conclusion as to the credibility of the witnesses. 161
The Fifth Circuit noted that the evidence had to reach the standard
of probable cause. 1 62 Without examining the credibility of the evidence
presented, the court held that the evidence in the record established prob-
able cause that Ntakirutimana was guilty of the crimes against him. 163
B. Critical Analysis
1. Constitutionality of the Executive-Agreement with the ICTR
The first issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit was whether an Article II
treaty is required for extradition. 164 Ntakirutimana challenged the validity
of the executive-congressional agreement entered into with the ICTR,
which provided for the extradition of fugitives found on United States ter-
ritory.165 The court correctly held that the executive agreement signed by
the President with the ICTR was a valid exercise of Presidential author-
the Office of the Prosecutor for the Tribunal. See id. (describing Prosper). The
third document was the declaration of a former Assistant United States Attorney
for the Central District of California. See In re Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708, at
*18. All three documents were authenticated by either the Ambassador of the
United States at Kigali, Rwanda, the site of the prosecutor for the ICTR, or the
Ambassador of the United States to the Netherlands, where the prosecutor is
based, in accordance with the terms of the congressional-executive agreement. See
Defense Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1342(a) (2), 110 Stat.
486 (1996); see also In re Ntakirutimana, 1998 WL 655708, at *18 (recognizing au-
thenticity of declarations).
157. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 428 (noting first committing court's
holding).
158. See id. (examining evidence submitted to first committing court). For a
discussion of the evidence submitted to the first and second committing courts, see
supra note 156 and accompanying text.
159. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 428 (describing Ntakirutimana's challenge
to credibility of evidence).
160. See id. at 429 (noting finding as to credibility).
161. See id. (noting finding as to credibility).
162. See id. at 427 (noting probable cause requirement).
163. See id. at 429 (noting evidence met probable cause requirement).
164. See id. at 424 (setting out first issue).
165. See id. (noting Ntakirutimana's challenge to validity of executive-congres-
sional agreement).
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ity. 166 The court was also correct in finding that the subsequent legisla-
tion passed by Congress to implement the agreement was a legitimate
exercise of congressional authority. 16 7 Thus, the Fifth Circuit was correct
in holding that an Article II treaty is not required for extradition.
168
The Fifth Circuit first examined the specific language of Article II to
determine whether it specifically required a treaty for extradition. 169 The
court relied on the Supreme Court decision of Terlinden v. Ames170 to con-
clude that a treaty is not required to extradite.1 7 1 In Terlinden, the Court
held that the power to extradite is included within the foreign relations
power of the President, irrespective of the fact that the treaty clause does
not expressly refer to extradition. 172
The Court in Valentine, however, qualified the President's power to
extradite by stating that the extradition of fugitives must be authorized by
law. 173 The focus of the Court's analysis in Valentine differed from the
Fifth Circuit's analysis in Ntakirutimana because in Valentine there existed a
controlling treaty.174 The constitutionality of the extradition request was
not being challenged.1 75 Rather, it was the interpretation of a specific
provision of the treaty that was in dispute.1 76 Nevertheless, in addressing
166. For a discussion of the President's authority to enter into executive
agreements and the validity of such agreements, see supra notes 1, 37 and accom-
panying text.
167. For a discussion of the validity of a legislative provision authorizing extra-
dition, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
168. For a discussion of whether an Article II treaty is required for extradi-
tion, see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
169. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 424 (indicating examination of Article II
language).
170. 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
171. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 424 (relying on Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S.
270 (1902)).
172. See Terlinden, 184 U.S. at 289 ("The power to surrender is clearly in-
cluded within the treaty-making power and the corresponding power of ap-
pointing and receiving ambassadors and other public ministers.").
173. See Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936) (stating that power to
extradite must be conferred by law). The Supreme Court in Valentine stated:
The desirability-frequently asserted by the representatives of our Gov-
ernment and demonstrated by their arguments and the discussions ofju-
rists-of providing for the extradition of nationals of the asylum state is
not a substitute for constitutional authority. The surrender of its citizens
by the Government of the United States must find its sanction in our law.
174. Id.
See id. at 6 (indicating existence of controlling treaty). The treaty under re-
view in Valentine was the Treaty of 1909 between the United States and France. See
id.
175. See id. (noting that constitutionality of treaty was not being challenged).
176. See id. (indicating dispute in treaty interpretation). The respondents in
Valentine were not challenging the constitutionality of their extradition, but rather
the validity of their extradition pursuant to the Treaty of 1909. See id. (describing
issue). The controlling provisions of the treaty are articles I and V. Article I states:
The Government of the United States and the Government of France
mutually agree to deliver up persons who, having been charged with or
2000] NOTrE
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the issue, the Valentine Court began its analysis by stating that extradition is
valid as long as there is a conventional or legislative provision conferring
the authority.177 Thus, the Fifth Circuit correctly applied the Valentine
analysis in holding that the executive agreement signed by the President
with the ICTR, and later implemented by Congress, was constitutional. 178
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish Probable Cause
The second issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit was whether the dis-
trict court erred in denying Ntakirutimana's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. 179 The Fifth Circuit, in affirming the district court, based its deci-
sion on Supreme Court precedent. 180 On this basis, the circuit court's
convicted of any of the crimes or offences specified in the following arti-
cle, committed within the jurisdiction of one of the contracting Parties,
shall seek an asylum or be found within the territories of the other: Pro-
vided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as,
according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged
shall be found, would justify his or her apprehension and commitment
for trial if the crime or offence had been there committed.
Id. at 6-7. Article V of the Treaty of 1909 states: "Neither of the contracting Parties
shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of
this convention." Id. at 7. The Valentine Court found that the language of the
treaty expressly forbid the United States to surrender its citizens. See id. at 8.
177. See id. at 8 (stating "albeit a national power, it is not confided to the
Executive in the absence of treaty or legislative provision").
178. See id. (indicating correct application of analysis). The Supreme Court
in Valentine expressly held that extradition must be based on law and that the law
can be conferred by treaty or legislative provision. See id. (holding that extradition
must have basis in law). In Ntakirutimana, the court upheld the validity of the
executive-congressional agreement upon which Ntakirutimana's extradition was
based. See Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding
validity of agreement). In doing so, the Fifth Circuit recognized the validity of
executive agreements. See id. ("Valentine indicates that a statute suffices to confer
authority on the President to surrender."). The court's holding was correct be-
cause the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the validity of executive agree-
ments. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981) (recognizing
President's power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining advice and
consent of Senate); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. L. F. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 462
(1964) (recognizing validity of executive agreements); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
15 (1957) (upholding executive agreement in process of handing down judgment
in case); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) ("The powers of the Presi-
dent in the conduct of foreign relations included the power, without consent of
the Senate, to determine the public policy of the United States. ... ); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (recognizing that not all international
agreements are treaties that require participation of Senate); Altman & Co. v.
United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-01 (1912) (recognizing that certain international
compacts do not require advice and consent of Senate). The Fifth Circuit based
the rest of its holding on the Supreme Court precedent handed down in Valentine.
See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 425-26 (relying on Valentine, 299 U.S. 5).
179. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 427 (addressing second issue).
180. See id. (basing decision on Supreme Court precedent). As to the second
issue, the Fifth Circuit held that the weight of the evidence could not be reviewed
by a habeas corpus petition. See id. (noting constitutional probable cause standard
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holding was authoritative. 181 The underlying factors motivating the court,
however, cast doubt upon the validity of its decision. 18 2
In Loisel, the Supreme Court held that habeas corpus review is limited
to a determination of whether the evidence was sufficient to establish
probable cause. 183 The weight and sufficiency of the evidence is not re-
viewable because this would result in the reviewing court engaging in fact
finding.' 84 Thus, the Fifth Circuit based its refusal to examine the credi-
bility of the evidence on precedent. 18
5
The challenge brought by Ntakirutimana concerned the credibility of
the witnesses' testimony.186 The Fifth Circuit refused to examine the testi-
mony, stating that this would place an unreasonable burden on the courts
and impair the extradition process. 18 7 The underlying issues motivating
the court in its decision requires a reexamination of the court's finding.
The request of Ntakirutimana's surrender marked the first time the
United States was asked to extradite a fugitive to the Rwandan tribunal.' 88
for sufficiency of evidence). In so holding, the court relied on the Supreme Court
case of Collins v. LoiseL See id. (citing Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922)).
181. See id. (basing decision on Supreme Court precedent).
182. See id. at 430-31 (Parker, J., concurring) (casting doubt upon validity of
court's decision).
183. See Loisel, 259 U.S. at 316 ("The function of the committing magistrate is
to determine whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused
to await trial, and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a
conviction."). At issue in Loisel was the denial of a habeas corpus petition, filed
after the fugitive was arrested on extradition proceedings. See Collins v. Miller, 252
U.S. 364, 365 (1920) (setting forth proceedings and nature of controversy). The
Court held that it was not its function to determine if the fugitive was guilty, but
rather to determine if the evidence justified surrendering him to the foreign juris-
diction. See Loisel, 259 U.S. at 315-16 (holding that court should determine
whether evidence justifies extradition).
184. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1981) ("The district judge
[on habeas corpus] is not to retry the magistrate's case."). The scope of review on
habeas corpus is very narrow and looks to little more than jurisdiction. See id. The
Supreme Court has stated that it is not necessary in an extradition proceeding for
.every technical detail... to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Fernandez v.
Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). The Supreme Court in Fernandez further stated
that habeas corpus is:
not a means for rehearing what the magistrate already has decided. The
alleged fugitive from justice has had his hearing and habeas corpus is avail-
able only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the
offence charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension,
whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was
reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.
Id.
185. For a discussion of Supreme Court precedent concerning the role of the
court on habeas corpus review, see supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
186. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 428 (noting challenge).
187. See id. at 429 (citing Loisel, 259 U.S. at 316 and Eain, 641 F.2d at 511.
188. See Harris & Kushen, supra note 6, at 561 (noting that Ntakirutimana was
first person requested for surrender by ICTR). The fact that Ntakirutimana was
the first person that the international criminal tribunal requested be surrendered
was well documented by the press. See, e.g., Crossette, supra note 82, at A10 ("His
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Because the United States was instrumental in forming the tribunal, the
legal impediments to Ntakirutimana's extradition have proven to be an
embarrassment to the United States. 189 Extraditing Ntakirutimana to the
ICTR would exemplify the United States' willingness to cooperate with the
tribunal.190 This showing of the United States' cooperation with the tribu-
nal is important because it would support the United States' effort to en-
courage cooperation with the tribunal. 19 1
The credibility of the witnesses' testimony is questionable for a variety
of reasons. First, eleven of the twelve witnesses were members of the Tutsi
tribe.' 9 2 Thus, as members of the rival tribe, the witnesses were biased in
their account of the events that occurred during the Rwandan civil war.1
9 3
Second, eleven of the twelve witnesses spoke Kinyarwanda, Rwanda's na-
tive language, but the interviews were conducted through translators of
English and French. 19 " This disparity in the languages used to conduct
the interviews brings into question the reliability of the witnesses' testi-
mony.' 9 5 Finally, Ntakirutimana has been a pastor for most of his life and
deportation to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ... would be the
first such action by the United States."); Nathan Koppel, Court Oks Rwandan's Extra-
dition; No Treaty Required Under Constitution, TEX. LAw., Aug. 16, 1999, at 1 ("Ntakiru-
timana also marks the first time the United States has been asked to surrender
someone to either of the two tribunals prosecuting war criminals .... "); Patty
Reinert, Appeals Court Says Pastor Must be Turned Over to Rwandan Tribunal, Hous.
CHRON., Aug. 6, 1999, at A42 ("If Ntakirutimana is extradited, it will be the first
time the United States has surrendered a defendant from America to a U.N. tribu-
nal."); Rights-Rwanda: Activists Praise U.S. Ruling on Genocide Suspect, INTER PRESS
SERV., Aug. 6, 1999, at 1 ("It sets an important... precedent as Mr. Ntakirutimana
is the first person that the United States has been asked to surrender to either of
the international criminal tribunals."). This is an indication of the importance
placed on the United States' cooperation with the tribunal's request. Since its
establishment, the tribunal has sentenced 38 war crimes suspects, including the
former Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, who it sentenced to life impris-
onment. See id.
189. See Crossette, supra note 82, at A1O ("Legal hurdles over the last three
years to prevent Mr. Ntakirutimana's deportation have been an unexpected em-
barrassment to the Clinton Administration. The United States had been instru-
mental in forming the tribunal in 1994 .... ").
190. See Koppel, supra note 188, at 1 (noting that precedent is set by cooperat-
ing with tribunal, as well as showing willingness to honor requests for surrender).
191. See id. (noting likely result of extradition of Ntakirutimana).
192. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 427 (stating that, of 12 witnesses, all but
one were Tutsi and 10 claimed Seventh Day Adventist as their religion).
193. See id. at 430 (Parker, J., concurring) (concurring in judgment but not-
ing that "[t]he evidence supporting the request is highly suspect").
194. See id. at 428 n.16 (noting that most witnesses spoke Rwanda's native
language).
195. See id. at 430-31 (Parker, J., concurring) ("Affidavits of unnamed Tutsi
witnesses acquired during interviews utilizing questionable interpreters in a polit-
ical environment that has all the earmarks of a campaign of tribal retribution
raises serious questions regarding the truth of their content."). The Fifth Circuit
held that it would presume that the translations were correct and refused to ad-
dress Ntakirutimana's argument concerning the credibility of the translations. See
id. at 430 (holding same). The court stated that "[t] he extradition court need not
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is married to a Tutsi.196 It seems implausible that he would suddenly turn
to violence and commit the atrocious crimes of which he is accused.
19 7
Therefore, the motivation of the Fifth Circuit in holding that the evidence
was sufficient to establish probable cause seems political rather than
judicial' 98
V. IMPACT
The Fifth Circuit's holdings in Ntakirutimana set forth both positive
and negative precedents for the future extradition of fugitives to criminal
tribunals. 199 The court correctly examined and applied Supreme Court
precedent concerning what an extradition request should be filed pursu-
independently inquire into the accuracy of the translations submitted with a for-
mal extradition request, because '[s] uch a requirement would place an unbearable
burden upon extradition courts and seriously impair the extradition process."' Id.
(quoting Tang Yee-Chun v. Immundi, 686 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
196. See id. at 431 (Parker, J., concurring) (noting facts).
197. See id. (Parker, J., concurring) (addressing implausibility of commission
of crimes). Justice Parker stated the following:
It defies logic, and thereby places in question the credibility of the under-
lying evidence, that a man who has served his church faithfully for many
years, who has never been accused of any law infraction, who has for his
long life been a man of peace, and who is married to a Tutsi would some-
how suddenly become a man of violence and commit the atrocities for
which he stands accused.
Id.
198. See id. (Parker, J., concurring) (noting political motivation for finding of
probable cause). Justice Parker wrote separately because, although he believed
that the law as laid out by the majority was correct, he questioned the validity of the
evidence presented by the government. See id. ("The evidence ... is highly sus-
pect."). He expressed his concerns as follows:
I fully understand that the ultimate decision in this case may well be a
political one that is driven by important considerations of State that tran-
scend the question of guilt or innocence of any single individual. I re-
spect the political process that necessarily is implicated in this case, just as
I respect the fact that adherence to precedent compels my concurrence.
Id.
199. See Kester, supra note 59, at 1443 (positing that court decisions dealing
with extradition need revamping). Kester maintains that court decisions dealing
with the United States extradition doctrine and extradition procedures "have
tended to repeat and misapply antique shibboleths without reexamining United
States extradition doctrine and procedures in the light of modern developments in
civil and criminal law." Id. This may be because most of the extradition cases are
heard in the Second, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, which contain the major
ports of entry into the United States, as well as some of the most aggressive United
States Attorneys' offices. See id. at 1443 n.12 (noting dynamics of certain circuits in
which extradition cases are most frequently heard). Most of the controlling
Supreme Court cases dealing with extradition predate World War I. See id. at 1491.
One of the most recent Supreme Court cases dealing with extradition was decided
in 1916. See Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511 (1916); see also, e.g., Glucksman v.
Henkel, 221 U.S. 508 (1911); Collins v. O'Neil, 214 U.S. 113 (1909);Johnson v.
Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181 (1902); Ornelas v. Ruiz,
161 U.S. 502 (1896).
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ant to. 200 In holding that an Article II treaty is not required for extradi-
tion, the court upheld the validity of the President's power to enter into
international agreements providing for extradition.2 0 1 Finding that the
executive-congressional agreement with the ICTR is constitutional lent
credence to the criminal tribunal.
20 2
The Fifth Circuit's ruling on the probable cause issue, however, is a
negative development. Although the court could justify its decision not to
review the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, its decision to do so
appears to have been motivated by political reasons. 20 3 The fact that the
overwhelming majority of the witnesses are members of the Tutsi tribe is a
red flag that their statements as to Ntakirutimana's activities may be
prejudiced. 20 4 As members of the minority tribe, and the victims of geno-
cide by the Hutu tribe, of which Ntakirutimana is a member, these wit-
nesses clearly had an interest in seeing someone who they viewed as an
enemy punished.
Another unsettling fact is that Ntakirutimana has been a pastor for
most of his life and is married to a Tutsi.20 5 Ntakirutimana was never sus-
pected of committing any crimes before these charges were brought
against him.20 6 Furthermore, the fact that he married a Tutsi is evidence
Kester suggests that Congress could improve the situation through legislation
and offers a few suggestions. See Kesteri, supra note 59, at 1443-91 (suggesting ways
to improve situation). One possibility suggested by Kester follows:
It would be more forthright and dependable for Congress to enact a stat-
ute to provide for something closer to a mini-trial of the accused in the
United States to test whether the accusations and evidence adequately
approach United States standards, and also to consider whether the ac-
cused may really have an unanswerable defense.
Id. at 1447.
200. For a discussion of what constitutes a proper extradition request, see
supra notes 165-79 and accompanying text.
201. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981) (upholding exec-
utive agreements); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (same); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (same).
202. See Kushen & Harris, supra note 75, at 515 (stating that "the [United
States' agreement] was intended to serve as an example for the international
community").
203. See Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 427-30 (5th Cir. 1999) (setting
forth Ntakirutimana's argument concerning failure of government to establish
probable cause and court's analysis in refuting this argument). For a discussion of
the court's holding as to Ntakirutimana's assertion that the evidence was not suffi-
cient to establish probable cause, see supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text.
204. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d at 428 n.16 (stating that eleven of twelve wit-
nesses were Tutsi). The Hutu tribe was the majority tribe during the 1994 conflict.
See id. at 421 (noting Hutu dominance). The Hutus and the Tutsis have histori-
cally been combatants and Ntakirutimana had a high-profile position in the Hutu
tribe as leader of the Rwandan church. See id. at 422 (noting Ntakirutimana's posi-
tion in tribe). Hence, because of the tension between the tribes and Ntakiru-
timana's position, the witnesses had great interest in seeing Ntakirutimana
punished.
205. See id. at 430 (Parker, J., concurring) (noting facts).
206. See id. (noting Ntakirutimana's clear record).
[Vol. 45: p. 107
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that he does not feel ethnic hatred, the impetus for the commission of
genocide, towards members of the Tutsi tribe.
20 7
The most important consideration for the Fifth Circuit in ruling on
this case in the manner in which it did seemed to be the preservation of
the United States' influence in the international arena.20 8 The United
States largely ignored evidence that crimes of genocide were being com-
mitted in Rwanda. 209 As a result, the United States was instrumental in
establishing the ICTR. 210 Should the United States refuse the extradition
of a Rwandan citizen, and a Hutu to boot, other nations may also hesitate
to comply with criminal tribunals in the future.
211
The precedent established by the Fifth Circuit in Ntakirutimana may
prove detrimental. Should courts view the decision in Ntakirutimana as
free reign to decide cases with an international scope on the basis of the
current political climate, the true guilt or innocence of any individual may
be compromised. The courtroom is in jeopardy of becoming a forum
where considerations of State, as opposed to the fundamental rights of
individuals, are furthered. 212
Panayiota Alexandropoulos
207. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (defining genocide as killing and
other acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethni-
cal, racial or religious group").
208. See Cassel, supra note 72, at 5 ("If not reversed, this ruling will hamstring
Washington's efforts to lean on other countries to cooperate with the Tribunal.").
Cassel notes that the United States' interest in the functioning of the ICTR also
stems from its extensive participation in funding and overseeing the tribunal. See
id. (opining that U.N. Tribunal is largely court of United States' making).
209. See Crossette, supra note 82, at Al0 ("The United States blocked Security
Council efforts to intervene while the genocidal campaign was in progress, a policy
for which President Clinton has since apologized to Africans."). Crossette further
stated that "[t]he legal hurdles raised over the last three years to prevent Mr.
Ntakirutimana's deportation have been an unexpected embarrassment to the Clin-
ton Administration." Id.
210. See id. (noting United States' role in establishing ICTR); see also Cassel,
supra note 72, at 5 (noting that United Nations Security Council set up ICTR to
prosecute genocide at urging of United States).
211. For discussion of how the United States serves as an example in the inter-
national community, see supra note 202; Koppel & Elliott, supra note 72, at 1 (not-
ing argument that Ntakirutimana should be extradited because this would set
international precedent for other countries' cooperation with international
tribunals).
212. See Kushen & Harris, supra note 75, at 517-18 (noting that extradition is
motivated by current foreign affairs). Kushen and Harris note as follows:
[The United States] surrender framework also retains the strict limita-
tions... on the ability of the fugitive to broaden the scope of an extradi-
tion proceeding. Thus, in a surrender proceeding a fugitive would be
prevented, in effect, from obtaining a full trial on the merits prior to
surrender, from litigating a Tribunal's motivation for prosecution, and
from complaining of the conditions to which he will be subject following
surrender .... [J]udicial consideration of these issues is prohibited, be-
2000] NOTE
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cause the Agreements do not envision such consideration and because
such consideration could become a significant irritant to the executive
branch's conduct of foreign affairs.
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